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SUBROGATION AND THE INNOCENT SPOUSE
DILEMMA
JOHN F. DOBBYN

t

INTRODUCTION
The problem of the payment of proceeds under a fire insurance policy
to an "innocent spouse" for damage caused by arson committed by the
guilty spouse still presents the courts with perplexing conflicts in decision
making. The basic problem is simple. A fire insurance policy covers
realty, usually a family home, which is owned jointly or in tenancy by the
entireties by a husband and wife. One of the spouses deliberately bums the
property. Clearly, the arsonist is barred from collecting proceeds by the
common law of the jurisdiction or a specific exclusion in the policy for
deliberately caused loss. The challenging issue is whether or not the
"innocent" co-insured spouse should be allowed to collect on the policy.
In deciding the issue, courts, through the years, worked their way
through at least five formulae for decision making in an attempt to resolve
the conflicts that trouble judicial minds. At the heart of the issue are
opposing pulls and tugs in the sensitive areas of public policy, equity
between the parties, willingness to stray from the actual wording of the
insurance policy, and fear of opening the insurer and a court to fraud. The
three primary interests to be balanced are prevention of profit to the
arsonist, fairness to the innocent spouse, and protection of the contracted
interests of the insurer.
Courts generally find that they are constrained to choose between two
possible outcomes-either granting or denying recovery of proceeds to the
innocent spouse. Because of complicating factors, courts are seldom
satisfied with either result. If a court grants recovery of proceeds to the
innocent spouse, there remains the realistic possibility that the guilty
spouse will share in the take. There is also the possibility that the
t Professor of Law, Villanova Law School, L.L.M. Harvard Law School, J.D. Boston
College Law School, A.B. Harvard College. I would like to recognize and express my
appreciation for the outstanding work of three excellent research assistants: Hal Schirmer, Martin
Ferro, and Mark Fischer.
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"innocent" spouse was actually in collaboration with the "guilty" spouse,
but the collaboration could not be proven.1 If a court denies recovery to
the innocent spouse, there is the possibility that the innocent party is being
made to suffer for the wrongs of the guilty party. Either way, a decision
for or against recovery by the innocent spouse frequently leaves a court
with an unsatisfied feeling that total justice was not accomplished. It is
difficult to tell how many decisions have been swayed by the prospect of
those equivocal feelings.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss an alternative option that
would more completely satisfy a court's sense of total justice and leave a
court free to grant the relief that it believes is fair to the innocent spouse.

I.

APPROACHES TO SEVERABILITY

To set the scene, the following is a summary of the approaches that
have been adopted by courts to date in resolving the issue of granting or
denying relief. In all cases, the basis for finding for one insured when a
co-insured is barred from recovery is the doctrine of severability of the
policy. Each of the different approaches to the issue of severability
discussed below is defined by determining which particular interest is to be
the focus of the analysis.
A.

Focus on PropertyInterest-IrrebuttablePresumption

The oldest approach begins with the traditional analysis of the
severability of any contract by determining whether or not there are
multiple promises made on each side of the contract such that the promises
on one side can be paired up with promises on the other side to provide
clear lines along which a contract can be severed. In the context of this
approach, a court focuses on the property interest or interests that are
insured against fire damage.2 If the interests of the spouses in the property
are held "in common," so that the interest of one spouse is legally separate
and distinct from the interest of the other, then the policy will be
considered severable, and, all else being equal, the innocent spouse may
recover proceeds.3 If, as is usually the case, the interests of the spouses are
I However, the major concern of the cases denying recovery seems to be a substantial
potential for collusion between the spouses. As one court has noted, "[p]articularly in the
husband and wife cases, an equally guilty spouse might recover policy proceeds because of the
difficulty of proving participation in or knowledge of the arson committed by the other spouse."
Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (quoting Spezialetti
v. Pac. Employees' Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 1139, 1141 (3d Cir. 1985)).
2 Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 590-91 (Iowa
1990).
3 Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1978).
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held by the entireties, or by any other form of joint interest, courts that
adhere to this approach believe that they are bound by a conclusive
presumption that the spouses' interests are indivisible.4 This presumption
has been further solidified by the ancient concept that in a marriage, a
husband and wife exist as a single entity.
The courts that follow this approach consider themselves unable to
sever the contract and the innocent spouse is not permitted to collect
proceeds.6 In such cases, courts that chafe at the sense of injustice to the
innocent spouse can at least partially console themselves with the thought
that they served public policy by preventing the guilty spouse from
profiting from misdeeds. 7
B.

Focus on PropertyInterest-RebuttablePresumption

A slight modification of the "property interest" approach came into
favor with the emergence of the public policy that an innocent insured
should not be penalized for the fraud and misdeeds of a co-insured. 8 It
sprang from the desire of some courts to give the innocent spouse a chance
to overcome the conclusive presumption of indivisibility that clung to a
tenancy by the entirety. 9 These courts have ruled that the presumption is
rebuttable, with the burden of rebutting on the innocent spouse.l(
The problem with this approach is that the escape hatch provided to
the innocent spouse is, practically speaking, locked shut." It is fine to
have the opportunity to prove that a tenancy by the entirety is, under
normal tenets of property law, divisible, except that it is settled law that2
such a tenancy is a form of joint ownership and is therefore indivisible.'
The interest insured is undivided between the two spouses and therefore all3
rights under an insurance policy must also be unitary and unseverable.'
As a result, it is generally impossible for the innocent spouse to disprove
the presumption. 14 The outcome of the claims of innocent spouses under
4 Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591. But see Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 1282, 1284
(N.M. 1980) (noting that the New Mexico courts had segregated out the joint interests of spouses
where "necessary to do so in order to avoid injustice," such as to satisfy a statutory judgment lien
for a personal tort committed by the wife).
Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591.
6 Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 591.
8Id.

9 Id.

Id.
IIId. at 592.

10

12

Id. at 590-91.

14
14 Id.
Id. atat 591.
592.
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this approach is, therefore, practically the same as under the "property
interest" approach.
C. Focus on InsurancePolicy
The third approach to emerge actually benefited the innocent insured.
Under this approach, the focus is taken off the property interest that is
insured and directed onto the wording of the contract of insurance.' 5 The
basis for this shift is the theory that the property interest should not be
equated with the interests under the insurance policy.1 6 The policy
proceeds are not intended to replace the property; instead, they act as a
contractual obligation of the insurer to make the insured whole for a
financial loss up to policy limits.' 7 The property interest is realty and is
to proceeds is
governed by the law of property, while the contract right
18
property.
personal
of
law
the
by
governed
is
and
personal
This opens the possibility of applying principles of policy
interpretation that clearly favor the insured. For example, the exclusion in
the policy for any loss deliberately caused is generally worded in such
phrases as "any loss arising out of any act committed by or at the direction
of the insured." Courts that apply the doctrine of contraproferentem-any
word or phrase that is ambiguous-subject to two or more possible
meanings-will be interpreted against the interest of the party drafting the
language 9-focus on the words "the insured." The reference could be to
each of the insureds, or it could be to the particular insured who committed
the act causing the loss. As between the two, a court is impelled to choose
the interpretation that limits the reference to the guilty insured, leaving the
innocent insured free of the exclusion and able to collect the proceeds.2 °
This approach favors the innocent insured that cannot prove the
As stated by the
divisibility of a property interest held by the entireties.
21
court in American Economy Insurance Co. v. Liggett:
The legal fiction of the entireties' estate in real estate is designed for the
protection of the spouses and the marriage. It was initially designed to
prevent the individual creditors of either spouse from taking the marital
home. The courts generally, and divorce courts in particular, find no
difficulty in dividing an entireties estate. [It is] a perversion of this legal

15 Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
16 Id. at 903.
17 Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 591.
18 id.
'9 Id. at 592.
20 Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Mich. 1981).
21 426 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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fiction, designed to protect the spouses' rights and marital
22 property, to
use it to destroy the property rights of an innocent spouse.
The problem for insureds is that some insurers have caught onto the
game and have changed the wording of the exclusion to any act committed
"by or at the direction of an insured., 23 Other insurers use the phrase "any
insured." Courts interpreting this language have been forced to conclude
that when the exclusion contains the words "an insured" or "any insured,"
the meaning is clear and unmistakably excludes coverage under the policy
for all insureds as long as any of the co-insureds deliberately causes the
loss. 24 "In short, if any insured commits arson, all insureds are barred from
25
recovering."
In Krupp v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 26 the New York court
recognized another path to finding for the innocent insured through the
ambiguity doctrine. Instead of focusing on specific words in the policy,
the court examined the general question of whether the interests of the
insureds in the policy generally were joint or several.27 Since the policy
did not specify the nature of the interest one way or the other, the court
would interpret the "ambiguity" in favor of the innocent insured and allow
recovery.28
D. Policy Interest-Doctrineof Reasonable Expectations
The simple act of changing "the insured" to "an insured" or "any
insured" and of specifying that the interests of the co-insureds in the policy
shall be considered joint rather than several appears, except for two
factors, to favor insurers. First, not all insurers have adopted the protective
language. 9 Secondly, some jurisdictions that apply this "new" approach
of focusing on the policy rather than the property interest insured have also
adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 30 Under this interpretive
approach, the actual language of the policy is of little consequence. 31 It is
presumed that the insured will not read or understand the actual language

22 Id. at 140.

Vance, 457 N.W.2d at 592.
Id. at 593.
id.
103 A.D.2d 252, 479 N.Y.S.2d 992 (2d Dep't 1984).
Id. at 258, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
Id., 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
29 E.g., Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 504 A.2d 896, 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
30 See Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1990); Krupp, 103 A.D.2d at
23

24
25
26
2
28

258, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
" See Krupp, 103 A.D.2d at 258, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (explaining that ambiguous language
in a policy would be interpreted against the insurer).
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of the policy. 32 The court will therefore rewrite the policy to comport with

the "reasonable expectations" of the insured, considering the type of
insurance purchased and the amount of premiums paid.33 The court stated
in Krupp v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. :34
Given the reasonableness of the expectation of an insured that his
individual interest would be covered by a policy naming him as insured
without qualification, a homeowners' policy which nowhere specified
whether the interests of a named insured husband and wife in property
held by both as tenants by the entirety were joint or several, would be
construed as covering the interests of each separately, and alleged arson
by the husband
would not defeat the wife's right to recover on her
35
interest.

Similarly, in the case of Madsen v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance
the insurer relied on the "increase of hazard" clause of the almost
universally used 165 line New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, under
which coverage is excluded when "the hazard is increased by any means
within the control or knowledge of the insured. 3 7 While interpreting that
language, the court applied the "reasonable insured" standard and found
that "the person owning an undivided interest in property and being a
named insured would reasonably suppose that his or her individual interest
CO.,36

in the property was covered by the policy.

'3 8

The court found, as a matter

of law, that the "increase of hazard" clause did not bar recovery by the
innocent spouse.3 9
This theory of looking to the joint or several interests of the coinsureds in the policy gives the court the greatest freedom to give
prominence to the public policy against penalizing an innocent co-insured
for the misdeeds of a guilty co-insured. While some courts still apply the
"old" approach of focusing on the joint or several nature of the property
interest of the insureds, the great majority of courts facing the issue in
modem times have opted for the "new" and "best reasoned" approach of
32 See Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985)
(noting that courts "recognize that, in the majority of cases, a lay person lacks the necessary
skills to read and understand insurance policies, which are typically long, set out in very small
type and written from a legalistic or insurance expert's perspective").
" See Krupp, 103 A.D.2d at 260-61, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 998 (requiring "a construction
consistent with the reasonable expectations of a policyholder in the shoes of an innocent named
insured" whenever ambiguous provisions are present).
34 103 A.D.2d 252, 479 N.Y.S.2d 992.
3- Id. at 258, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
36 439 N.W.2d 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
31 Id. at 609.
38 Id. at 613 (quoting Hedtke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 739 (Wis. 1982)).
39 id.
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focusing on interests in the policy, whether under the contraproferentem
or the reasonable expectations method of interpretation.4 °
E.

Focus on the Wrongful Act

One final approach to the issue is to focus on neither the property
interests nor the policy interests, but rather on the wrongful act itself.41 If
the act was committed jointly or with collusion between the spouses, the
exclusion applies to both. If the act is performed by one spouse separately,
with no collusion between them, the innocent spouse can recover
regardless of the type of interest in the property or the policy. Since the
insurer is seeking the benefit of its exclusion, it bears the burden of
proving that the wrongful act was performed jointly by the spouses.42
This theory opens the door for recovery by an innocent spouse who
can prove neither the divisibility of property interest nor the severability of
contract interests under the policy.
One question that arose, when innocent spouses were permitted to
recover, was whether the recovery should be 100% or 50% of the amount
of the loss up to the policy limit. Almost universally, the courts have
agreed that since rights under the policy are severed down the middle,
recovery by the innocent party should be limited to 50%. 4 3 One of the
40

See, e.g., Vance v. Pekin Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 1990) (stating that the rule

is "the best reasoned rule because under it courts use a contract analysis and have some concerns
for equity."); Krupp v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 103 A.D.2d 252, 258, 479 N.Y.S.2d 992, 997 (2d
Dep't 1984) ("The more modem 'dominant' rule focuses on the contract of insurance rather than
the property rights of the parties .. "); Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706
S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) ("[T]his test will ... permit an innocent victim whose property has

been destroyed to collect under an insurance policy for a loss reasonably expected to be
covered.").
41 We hold that the trial court correctly determined that the fraud of the husband was
no bar to recovery under the policy by the innocent wife. However, we reach this
result irrespective of whether the interests of the wife and husband in the tenancy by
the entirety, in the personal property, or in the contract rights under the policy are
deemed to be joint or several. The significant factor is that the responsibility or
liability for the fraud-here, the arson-is several and separate rather than joint, and
the husband's fraud cannot be attributed or imputed to the wife who is not implicated
therein. Accordingly, the fraud of the co-insured husband does not void the policy as
to plaintiff wife.
Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 240, 242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
42 Krupp, 103 A.D.2d at 259, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98.
The test for divisibility of the
wrongful act in community property is to determine whether or not the wrong committed by one
spouse "was of actual or potential benefit to the community." Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 620
P.2d 1282, 1285 (N.M. 1980). If not, the wrong could be assigned solely to the wrongdoer, and
the innocent spouse could collect insurance proceeds. Id.
43 See, e.g., Brown v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 468 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991) ("[T]he innocent coinsured spouse is entitled to recover one-half of the actual damages up
to the policy limits.").
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extremely rare situations in which 100% recovery has been permitted was
when the husband died in the fire that he set and, therefore, all rights under
the policy belonged to the surviving and innocent wife. 4
A more difficult issue arises when the amount of the loss exceeds the
limit of the policy. For example, if the policy limit is $50,000 and the
amount of the loss is $80,000, should the innocent spouse be allowed to
recover 50% of the policy limit ($25,000) or 50% of the loss, as long as it
is within the policy limit ($40,000)? The usual answer to the question is
that the innocent insured is allowed to recover 50% of the loss as long as it
is within the policy limits. 45 In the hypothetical, the recovery would be

$40,000.
II.

SOURCES OF DISCOMFORT FOR THE COURTS.

Neither a decision for nor against recovery by the "innocent" spouse
under any of the approaches discussed above has left courts completely
satisfied. If recovery is denied on some technical ground, such as the
theoretical indivisibility of a tenancy by the entireties, there is the lingering
dissatisfaction that goes with penalizing the innocent spouse for the
misdeeds of the guilty spouse that are beyond the knowledge or control of
the innocent spouse.46 The penalty is a serious one, because the family
home may have been destroyed, and replacement or repair may be
impossible without insurance proceeds.47
The accomplishment of
technical legal correctness is of little consolation to the court or the
innocent spouse.
On the other hand, a decision for the innocent spouse is riddled with
doubt and irresolution. The greatest fear is that the guilty party will
indirectly profit from his or her spouse's recovery.48 This becomes likely
if the spouses remain married and living together after the recovery. 49 The
recovery may only be in the range of 50% of the loss instead of 100%, but
nonetheless, courts are seriously troubled by the prospect of placing any
44 Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981).
45 See, e.g., Brown, 468 N.W.2d at
247.
46 See Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953,
955 (Tex.

1986).

47 See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Wis. 1982) ("Having lost
the
property, the innocent insured is victimized once again by the denial of the proceeds forthcoming
under the fire insurance policy.") (citing Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 140 n.l
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).
48 See Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 426 N.E.2d at 140 ("Where there is some prospect that the guilty
party might benefit ... the trial court [can] determine whether that prospect exists and to protect
against it.") (citations omitted).
49 See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F. Supp. 543,
547 (D. Colo. 1982).
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insurance proceeds under the control of the arsonist spouse. It results in at
least a partially successful fraud on both the insurer and the court. Such
uneasiness could well influence a court's decision to grant or withhold
recovery at all, or even lead a court to adopt as precedent one of the more
restrictive approaches to the issue that would bar future innocent spouses
from recovery even under circumstances in which the guilty spouse would
not benefit.
If a husband and wife are legally separated or divorced, courts tend to
be less concerned about the possibility of the guilty spouse sharing in the
take. 50 However, if the insurance proceeds are sufficiently motivating, a
court's concern is not completely removed, because the spouses may
undertake a temporary separation as part of the fraud on the insurer and the
court.5 1 Even if the spouses are legally separated or divorced, it is seldom
possible for a court to know with certainty the true financial relationship
between them.
Only in the rare case in which the arsonist dies in the fire or dies
before the payment of proceeds, can a court feel that the entire benefit will
go to the innocent spouse. 52 For example, in Felder v. North River
Insurance Co., 53 the husband set fire to his family home and then
committed suicide with a gun during the fire. The court found no
possibility that the husband could profit personally from the proceeds and
awarded 100% of the loss in proceeds to the innocent wife.54
Even in cases in which the guilty party does not survive, if in some
way a portion of the proceeds descends to his personal heirs or legatees, it
is possible that he has in some way benefited. On the other hand, courts
tend to consider such heirs or legatees as being innocent recipients
unmarred by their benefactor's guilt.55
In Madsen v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co., 56 the appellate
court assuaged its conscience in allowing recovery by the innocent spouse,
50 See, e.g., Travelers Cos. v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708, 711-12 (Tex. App. 1992) (noting
that after a divorce the culpable spouse may not receive a benefit for his act of arson).
51 Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing the risk
of collusion between spouses to enable coverage through sham partitions or divorces).
52 See, e.g., Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 426 N.E.2d at 139-40, 142, 144-45 (finding no reason to
deny the innocent plaintiff a full recovery when the arsonist is dead, because the arsonist cannot
profit from his wrongdoing).
5' 435 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
54 Id. at 266.
55 See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F. Supp. 543,
547 (D. Colo. 1982) ("It is the Court's view that in balancing the equities of the case at bar, the
facts and circumstances favor the payment to the innocent spouse and children. They have lost
indemnified property from an event that is fortuitous as to them.") (emphasis added).
56 439 N.W.2d 607, 613-14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
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which could possibly benefit the guilty spouse, by dropping the problem
into the lap of the trial court. The case was remanded with instructions to
the trial court to undertake the "factual" inquiry as to whether and how the
recovery by the wife could be "tailored" so as to prevent the husband from
recovering any benefit. 57 The court did suggest two possible tools that
could be useful in the tailoring. One was the issuance of a check made out
solely to the innocent wife and the other was the use of a trust to be funded
with the proceeds for the sole benefit of the wife. 8
While each of these tools might protect an unwilling spouse from
sharing the proceeds with the guilty spouse at the time of first payment, it
is clear that they could not block a subsequent voluntary or even prearranged sharing between the spouses.
A concomitant fear of the court when recovery is granted is that the
"innocent" spouse was actually in collusion with the guilty spouse in
committing the arson, or at least knew of and consented to the act, but that
the true facts never came to light. Arson itself is frequently difficult to
prove in view of the fact that the evidence is often burned to ashes. There
are true experts in the field of fire investigation, but their numbers are
generally few and they are expensive to hire. In a difficult case, the
amount in controversy may not justify the expense of a top-line
investigator. But even if arson is proven, the role of the "innocent" spouse
may simply remain undetected or unproven.
Where a court has adopted a theory that allows for the possibility of
recovery, another factor may seriously tilt the playing field in favor of a
spouse who is in possible, but unproven, collusion with the guilty partner.
In the many jurisdictions that have adopted the first-party bad faith cause
of action,59 the insurer is subject to an effective squeeze play that can
seriously hamper its ability to take the time necessary for a full
investigation of the innocence of the claimant. 60 It is not uncommon for
the claimant under first party insurance to combine the claim for proceeds
with the threat of a cause of action for bad faith failure to pay proceeds
without delay.61
"

Id. at 613.
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1274-75 (Colo. 1985); White v.
Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1017-19 (Idaho 1986); Pickett v. Lloyds, 600 A.2d 148,
152-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), affid, 621 A.2d 445, 458 (N.J. 1993); Anderson v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (Wis. 1978).
60 Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377 ("[T]he possibility of scaring insurers into paying
questionable claims because of the threat of a bad faith suit and its excessive damages is
undesirable.") (quoting John W. Thornton & Milton S. Blaut, Bad Faith and Insurers:
Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 FORUM 699, 719 (1977)).
61 See, e.g., Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 51-52 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
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In jurisdictions that treat the bad faith cause of action as one sounding
in tort rather than contract, 62 awards may include punitive damages and/or
damages for emotional distress. This threat becomes more realistic when
the damaged property is not jewelry or a boat but the very home of the
insured. Further, neither of these forms of damages would be subject to
policy limits. Under this circumstance, an insurer can be forced to shorten
the investigation of the "innocent" spouse's collusion in the arson and pay
the claim rather than risk a potentially heavier loss beyond policy limits.
It has been suggested that a solution to the problem of solving the
suspected collusion of the claiming spouse might lie in a shift of the
burden of proof. 63 Once the insurer has proven the existence of arson, the
burden could be shifted to the claiming spouse to prove his innocence of
either collusion or knowledge and approval. 64
While such a rule might ease a court's discomfort in allowing a
finding for the claimant, it might also swing the pendulum too far in the
opposite direction. It may, in fact, put us back to the days of the
"rebuttable presumption" rule discussed above. 65 To receive proceeds for
the destroyed home, the innocent spouse would have to clear the difficult
hurdle of proving a negative. Proving a lack of collusion, or even a lack of
knowledge and tacit approval of the arson, might be an insurmountable
burden when the only evidence is frequently the obviously self-serving
testimony of the claimant. The result could be a practical bar to recovery
by truly innocent spouses.
III. AN IMPORTANT NEXT STEP
The crux of a court's discomfort in allowing or disallowing the
innocent spouse to recover is the constant tug-of-war between two tenets
of public policy: (1) a wrongdoing spouse should not be allowed to
profit--directly or indirectly-from his wrongdoing; and (2) an innocent

that an insurer's unreasonable delay may sometimes constitute bad faith).
62 See, e.g., Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 772-76 (Neb. 1991) (finding that
the insurance company's control of litigation and an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing gives rise to a fiduciary duty bringing bad faith causes of action into a tort action),
overruled on other grounds by Wortman ex rel. Wortman v. Unger, 578 N.W.2d 413 (Neb.
1998); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 857-58 (Wyo. 1990) (following the

line of cases finding a cause of action for bad faith against a first-party insurer to be a tort cause
of action rather than a contract cause of action).
63 Leanne English Cerven, The Problem of the Innocent Co-InsuredSpouse: Three Theories
on Recovery, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 849, 871 (1983).
64 Id. at 871-72.
65 See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
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spouse should not be disadvantaged by the wrongdoing of the guilty
spouse.66
What frequently turns this tug-of-war into a conundrum that can
distort a just solution is the major problem of proof. It is practically
impossible in many cases to prove either that the "innocent" spouse is truly
innocent of all collusion or that the guilty spouse will not reap some
benefit from the recovery of proceeds by the innocent spouse. Therefore,
when such a fact cannot be proven one way or the other, the finding of fact
on which the court's ruling must be made simply falls by default in favor
of the party that does not bear the burden of proof. This can leave the
court with an unsatisfactory basis on which to rule, and hard cases, as the
saying goes, can indeed make bad law.
There is, however, the possibility of one more step in the process that
might help to balance the competing interests more equitably. That step is
an action in subrogation by the insurer against the guilty spouse.
The doctrine of subrogation is of equitable origin,6 7 and in its most
general statement, applies as follows. If party A pays to party B a debt that
ought to have been paid by party C, and party A has paid not as a
volunteer, party A should stand in the shoes of party B in having
subrogated standing to bring party B's action against party C to recover the
amount paid by party A.68 In relating that general doctrine to the present
context, if the innocent spouse has a cause of action against the guilty
spouse for deliberately burning property in which the innocent spouse has
an interest, and the insurer has paid proceeds under contractual obligation
to the innocent spouse because of that property loss, the insurer should be
subrogated to the innocent spouse's cause of action against the guilty
spouse up to the amount of the proceeds paid.6 9
The two underlying premises of this form of subrogation are: (1) that
the insurer should be reimbursed by the wrongdoer for proceeds it was
compelled to pay because of the wrongdoer's act, thereby bringing the loss
to rest on the wrongdoer; and (2) that an insured should not be allowed to
recover twice for the same loss-once from the insurer and once from the
wrongdoer. 70 By permitting an insurer, who has paid proceeds for a loss to
the insured to recover the amount of those proceeds from the wrongdoer,
66 See Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Liggett, 426 N.E.2d 136, 140, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing the trial court's analysis of determining whether the liable party will benefit from the
innocent spouse's recovery).
67 Dix Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaFramboise, 597 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ill. 1992).
68 See id. at 626; WILLIAM R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE

787-88 (3d ed. 1976).
69 Allstate Ins. Co. v. LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d 646, 649-51 (Neb. 2001).
70

Id. at 649-50.
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the insured is made whole for the loss just once, and the actual loss falls on
the wrongdoer.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. LaRandeau71 is among the relatively few
reported cases that deal with subrogation in this context. Mr. LaRandeau
deliberately burned and destroyed the residence jointly owned by himself
and his wife.72 The insurer paid half of the total value of the property to
the wife, in spite of an exclusion in the policy for destruction of property
by "[i]ntentional or criminal acts of or at the direction of any insured
person."73 The insurer then brought an action against the husband for the
amount paid to the wife by claiming that it was subrogated to the cause of
action of the wife against the husband.74
One potential impediment to the ability of the insurer to bring a
subrogated action in this context is the anti-subrogation rule that
encompasses the principle that an insurer cannot be subrogated to a cause
of action against one of its own insureds under the same policy.

75

The

76

husband in LaRandeau raised two defenses based on public policy. The
first defense was that an insurer should not be permitted to pass part or all
of a loss for which it was paid to provide coverage from itself to one of its
insureds under the same policy. 77 The second defense was that allowing

subrogation against one of its own insureds could put the insurer in a
conflict of interest with that insured.78
As stated in Home Insurance Co. v. Pinski Brothers, Inc. ,79 an action
in subrogation against its own insured on the same loss would:
(1) allow the insurer to expend premiums collected from its insured to
secure a judgment against the same insured on a risk insured against; (2)
give judicial sanction to the breach of the insurance policy by the insurer;
(3) permit the insurer to secure information from its insured under the
guise of policy provisions available for later use in the insurer's
subrogation action against its own insured; (4) allow the insurer to take
advantage of its conduct and conflict of interest with its insured; and (5)
approval of a breach of the insurer's relationship with
constitute judicial
80
its own insured.

71

Id. at 648, 651.

72

Id. at 648.

73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 Id.

71 See id. at 649-50.
76

Id. at 649.

77 See id.
71 See id.
7' 500 P.2d 945 (Mont. 1972).

"

Id. at 949.
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Also, the insurer would be conflicted by providing a strong defense
for the guilty insured if the insured were sued by a third party for
destruction of property because a finding of arson would set up a possible
subrogated cause of action against the guilty insured to recover any
proceeds paid to a co-insured. In all, as found by the court in the Pinski
Brothers, there would be a violation of the equity maxims that "[o]ne who
seeks equity must do equity... [and o]ne who seeks equity must come
into court with clean hands. 81
The court in LaRandeau cut the Gordian knot by finding that because
the policy excluded coverage for a loss deliberately caused by the husband,
as to that loss, the husband should not be considered to be an "insured"
under the policy. 82 Therefore, because Mr. LaRandeau was not considered
an insured in this particular instance, the insurer would not be passing
liability back to an insured, and the insurer did not incur a conflict of
interest with an insured. Neither of the two public policies applied to
prevent subrogation.83
The court was led to that interpretation of the term "insured" by
concluding that any other interpretation would bar subrogation's beneficial
effect of placing the loss on the guilty party.84 As the court stated,
"recognition of Allstate's subrogation claim against [LaRandeau] for the
amounts which it paid to his wife, who was considered an innocent
insured, serves the legitimate purpose of placing
ultimate responsibility for
85
the loss upon the intentional wrongdoer."
Mr. LaRandeau further argued that subrogation should not be allowed
because it exists only as to the "rights of the insurer against thirdpersons

81 Id.
82

LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d at 650.

83 See id.
'
85

Id. at 651.
Id. There is also precedent in other contexts. For example, in the case of Perl v. St. Paul

Fire & Marine Insurance Co., an attorney and his law firm were both insured under a policy of
malpractice insurance. 345 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn. 1984). The attorney was held to have
committed a breach of fiduciary duty owed to a client, and the law firm was held vicariously

liable as well. Id.at 211. The penalty was forfeiture of a $20,000 fee to the client. Id. In an action
by the attorney and the law firm for indemnification for the forfeiture under the malpractice
policy, the court found that as a matter of public policy, indemnification for the loss due to the
breach of fiduciary duty should not be enforceable by the attorney against the malpractice
insurer. Id.at 215-16. However, since the law firm was only vicariously liable, the court held
that the law firm could be indemnified for the $20,000 forfeiture. Id at 216. The court stated that
since coverage for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty would not be allowed for the attorney,
the attorney was an "insured" in this instance and the insurer could bring a subrogated action
against the attorney. Id.at 216-17. Clearly the court was seeking an interpretation of the word
"insured" that would ultimately place the $20,000 loss on the wrongdoing attorney.
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to whom the insurer owes no duty." 86 The court found that since the
husband's deliberate destruction of the property was not covered by the
homeowner's policy, the insurer did not owe the husband a duty under the
policy. 87 The husband in this instance is a third party in regards to the
relationship between the insurer and his wife.88
One final block thrown by Mr. LaRandeau was the interspousal
immunity doctrine that he claimed was a bar to any cause of action by his
wife against him as to which the insurer could be subrogated. 89 The court
avoided the block on the grounds that in Nebraska, as in many other
jurisdictions, the interspousal immunity doctrine has been abrogated.90
Mrs. LaRandeau could clearly bring an action against her husband for
waste. 91
In jurisdictions where the interspousal immunity doctrine exists,
however, subrogation rights of the insurer are affected. For example, in
Treciak v. Treciak,92 the wife burned down the home owned and insured
singly by the husband. The insurer paid to the husband the full claim for
the fire damage and then sought to bring a subrogated cause of action
against the wife to recover the proceeds paid.93 The court stated that "[t]he
Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that a direct action between
spouses, even for an intentional tort committed in the midst of a divorce is
barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity., 94 The subrogated action
of the insurer, therefore, had to fail since "[a]s subrogee, USAA places
itself 'in the shoes of the95 subrogor, i.e. the husband, and has no rights
greater than the husband.,
The right of subrogation can arise in either one of two ways.
"Conventional" subrogation rights arise under the terms of the contract
itself. In LaRandeau, for example, the policy provided, "[w]hen we pay
for any loss, an insured person's right to recover from anyone else
becomes ours up to the amount we have paid.",96 Absent a contractual
provision, it exists in all jurisdictions as an equity formulation under
common law and is referred to as "legal" subrogation.97
86 LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d at 650.
87 td.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 Id.
"' See id.

92 547 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
93 Id.

94 Id.
95 Id.
96 LaRandeau, 622 N.W.2d at 648.
97 See VANCE & ANDERSON, supranote 68, at 793.
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In whatever form the right of subrogation arises, it is clearly a child of
the court of equity, and as such, it will or will not be enforced by the court
in its discretion solely to serve the ends of fairness and justice among the
parties concerned.
As the court stated in Dix Mutual Insurance Co. v.
98
LaFramboise:
Subrogation is allowed to prevent injustice and unjust enrichment but
will not be allowed where it would be inequitable to do so. There is no
general rule which can be laid down to determine whether a right of
subrogation exists
since this right depends upon the equities of each
99
particular case.

There are some defined limits to the application of the subrogation
doctrine. For example, in Dix, a homeowner and a tenant were co-insureds
under the same policy. 00 The tenant negligently caused a fire which
damaged the insured premises. 10 1 The insurer paid $40,000 in proceeds to
the homeowner and sought to bring an action in subrogation against the
negligent tenant.102 The court denied the insurer the ability to bring a
subrogated action against a negligent co-insured on the grounds that it was
the intent and reasonable expectation of the parties, based on the lease
agreement and the policy as a whole, that any loss negligently caused by
any of the insureds should be indemnified by the insurer.' °3 In equity and
fairness, one who negligently causes the loss does not sufficiently qualify
as a "wrongdoer" to overcome the doctrine disallowing subrogation
04
against a co-insured. 1

An interesting argument was made by the insurer in the case of
Volquardson v. HartfordInsurance Co. of the Midwest.10 5 The plaintiff's
husband burned their home to the ground as part of a suicide attempt
without the knowledge or complicity of the plaintiff. 106 The plaintiff made
a claim against the insurer for the full amount of the policy limit under the
Nebraska statute that stated, "[t]he amount of the insurance written in
[plaintiffs] policy shall be taken conclusively to be the true value of the
98 597 N.E.2d 622 (Il1. 1992).
99 Id. at 624.

100Id. at 623.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103

See id. at 626.

104Id. In LaSalle National Bank v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co., the court contrasted

the situation of the negligent co-insured with that of the arsonist co-insured and concluded that
only in the case of deliberate misconduct does the equitable principle of placing the loss on the
wrongdoer permit subrogation against the wrongdoer as a noninsured under the policy. 958 F.
Supp. 384, 387-89 (N.D. 111.1997).
105 No. 4:00CV3340, 2003 WL 1191404 (D. Neb. Mar. 14, 2003).
106

Id. at * 1.
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7
property insured and the true amount of loss and measure of damages."' 10
Under this statute, the wife was claiming to be entitled to proceeds for
100% of the loss.10 8 The insurer raised the defense that under LaRandeau,
it only needed to pay half of the amount of property damage because of its
right of subrogation against the husband. 10 9 The court rejected this defense
on the proposition that since subrogation serves the purpose of reimbursing
the insurer for amounts paid, no such right of subrogation exists until the
insurer actually pays the claim of the insured plaintiff. 10
Another area in which courts exercise their discretion to tailor
subrogation to the equities of the case is that of the voluntariness of the
payment by the insurer to the innocent spouse. To be entitled to
subrogation, the insurer must have paid proceeds under a contractual or
other obligation rather than as a volunteer."' In the case of HartfordFire
Insurance Co. v. Advocate, 1 2 for example, a property owned and insured
by a partnership was severely damaged by fire.' 13 The partnership filed a
claim for $332,000, which the insurer paid, in spite of an indication that
one of the partners, Michael Advocate, had arranged for the fire for the
purpose of destroying personal records that were relevant to his divorce
action. 114 The insurer brought an action as subrogee of the partnership
against the guilty partner."15 The defendant raised the defense that the
insurer paid the claim to the partnership as a volunteer, rather than under16
contractual obligation, and was, therefore, not entitled to subrogation.
The basis for the argument was that the policy contained an exclusion for
any loss "caused by... any fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act done by
or at the instigation of any insured, partner or joint venturer."' 17 Since the
same insurer had rejected a claim by Advocate on his separate policy for
his personal items destroyed in the same fire on the grounds that there was
evidence to show that Advocate deliberately caused the fire, the insurer
must have been aware of a valid defense to the subsequent payment of the

NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-501.02 (1998).
108 Volquardson, 2003 WL 1191404, at *5.
107

109Id.

"0 Id. at *6. The Volquardson court did not deal with the issue of whether or not the wife is
entitled to more than 50% of the loss, since the only argument raised by the insurer in that
respect was the offset because of the right of subrogation. Id. at *6 n.3.
l1 See VANCE & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 791-92.
u2 162 A.D.2d 20, 560 N.Y.S.2d 331 (2d Dep't 1990), rev'd, 78 N.Y.2d 1038, 581 N.E.2d
1335, 576 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1991).
113 Id. at 22, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
114 Id. at 22-23, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
.. Id. at 23, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
116Id. at 23-24, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
117 Id. at 22, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
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partnership's claim.11 8 Advocate,9 therefore, claimed that the payment to
the partnership was "voluntary.""
In coming to its decision upholding the right of the insurer to bring
the subrogated action, the court was aware that the subrogated claim of the
insurer turned on whether the court found the payment to be voluntary or
involuntary. 120 In applying its equitable discretion, the court was also
aware that subrogation would not only reward the insurer for making a
quick payment of proceeds necessary to its insured, but would also place
the loss squarely on the wrongdoer. 121 It is not, therefore, surprising that
the court chose to find the payment of proceeds to be under contractual
obligation and not voluntary, in spite of the use of the policy words in the
exclusion, "criminal act done by or at the instigation of any insured,
partner or joint venturer,"' 122 and even though, at the time of the payment,
"the insurance company had some indication that Advocate may have
procured the fire."' 23 The court dodged the first bullet (the use of the
words, "any... partner," in the policy) by finding that in causing the fire,
Advocate was acting for personal reasons and was not acting in the
capacity of "any ... partner."' 124 It dodged the second bullet-the insurer's
awareness of Advocate's arson-by noting that it was only subsequent to
the payment to the partnership that a jury made the conclusive finding that
125
Advocate had caused the fire.
While most insurers have been content with a subrogated right to
recover the amount paid to the innocent spouse, the insurer in Madsen v.
Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co. 126 expanded the envelope by
bringing a subrogated action against the guilty husband seeking not only
the amount paid as proceeds under the policy, 127 but also attorney's fees
See id. at 24, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
560 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
24-27, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 333-35.
27, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
560 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (emphasis added).
560 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
114 Id. at 22, 27, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332, 335.
125 Id. at 27, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The court stated:
118

119 Id. at 23,
12o See id. at
121 See id. at
122 Id. at 22,
123 Id. at 27,

As the insurance company acted properly in paying the innocent partnership under its
policy, it should not be precluded from seeking recovery of that payment from
Advocate via subrogation. "[S]ubrogation is a creature of equity having for its purpose
the working out of an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the
ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to
pay it." It appears to us that Advocate, an obvious wrongdoer, should be obligated to
pay for the damages which resulted from his own conduct of setting the fire.
Id., 560 N.Y.S.2d at 335 (citation omitted).
26 439 N.W.2d 607 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
127 Id. at 608. The husband who burned the property conceded the insurer's
right to this

THE INNOCENT SPOUSE DILEMMA

2004]

1113

and the costs of adjusting the
expended in proving the guilt of the husband,128
arson.
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resulted
that
claim
The court disallowed the recovery of attorney's fees on the grounds
that under what it termed the "'American rule,' the prevailing litigant is
not entitled to collect attorney fees unless authorized by statute or
contract," ' 2 9 and no such statutory or contractual authorization existed. 30
The exception to this rule occurs when the wrongful act of the defendant in
the subrogated action has been the proximate cause of involvement of the
insurer1 in litigation with other parties, a situation that did not obtain in this
case.

13

The Madsen court did, however, find that the insured was entitled to
any consequential damages that were the "natural and proximate result" of
the wrongful act of the husband.' 32 What specific items would qualify as
consequential damages is a question of fact for the jury, but the court noted
that this could include, in addition to proceeds paid, the reasonable
expenses incurred in adjusting any claims filed for the lOSS. 133 The court
also did not rule out the possibility of punitive damages against the arsonist
34

husband.
FINAL ANALYSIS

How then does subrogating the insurer to the claim against the guilty
co-insured spouse affect the balance of equities among the innocent
insured, the guilty insured, and the insurer?
On the plus side, the major benefit is that it places the loss squarely
on the only party who is guilty of wrongdoing-at least to the extent of the
ability of the wrongdoer to pay the subrogated judgment out of his
personal assets. This particularly appeals to the equity court's sense of
justice. This level of assurance that the wrongdoer will not share in any
proceeds could act as a major inducement to courts in setting precedents
that will more liberally facilitate the ability of the innocent spouse to
collect proceeds for his interest in the damaged property. This is no small
consideration, since the rebuilding of the family home could depend on
receipt of insurance proceeds.
reimbursement. Id. at 610.
128 Id. at611.
129 Id.
130

id.

131See id.
132

Id.

133See id.
' Id. ("Additionally, because there are factual disputes relating to the issue of punitive
damages against Robert, summary judgment is inappropriate.").
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Liberal allowance of subrogation also benefits insurers in more ways
than is obvious. Clearly, it is a benefit to be able to recoup proceeds paid
to the innocent spouse. But in addition, foresight of the enhanced
possibility of recoupment would also allow the insurer to be more liberal
and prompt in paying proceeds to the innocent party without standing on
every technical defense available to it. This would have the inevitable
effect of building good will with its insureds as well as with the courts.
The right of subrogation further gives insurers an incentive to
diligently ferret out and take action against arsonists. This is a significant
factor, since this form of private enforcement against the destructive and
dangerous crime of arson could effectively bolster the efforts of otherwise
occupied public prosecutors and law enforcement officials. The net result
could be an added deterrent to future arsonists and, therefore, a reduction
of the proceeds that insurers are required to pay in the first place. These
savings, together with subrogated reimbursements, could be used to reduce
premiums to policyholders, as well as to increase profits to the insurers.
These benefits would also flow to innocent insureds in the form of a
climate in which, as in the Advocate case,135 insurers are induced to pay
claims more quickly. Precedent such as the Advocate 136 decision would
allow proceeds to be paid without the insurer's having to investigate and
press every possible defense against the insured out of fear of being
considered a "volunteer" for subrogation purposes.
The benefits to the public of liberal allowance of subrogation are also
considerable. Primary among these could be the deterrence of arson.
Considering the fact that in the year 2000, over $1.5 billion worth of
insured property was destroyed by arsonists, and that according to FBI
estimates, only about 17% of the incidents of arson result in arrest because
of the difficulty of acquiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 137 civil
enforcement, where the standard of proof is merely a preponderance of the

135 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Advocate, 162 A.D.2d 20, 560 N.Y.S.2d 331 (2d Dep't 1990),
rev'd, 78 N.Y.2d 1038, 581 N.E.2d 1335, 576 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1991). Note that in the Advocate
case, the insurer paid the claim of the innocent partnership in the amount of $332,183.09 in full
satisfaction of that insured's claim in spite of the defense available to it in the form of the
exclusion from coverage of any loss caused by "any fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act done by
or at the instigation of any insured, partner or joint venturer," and evidence to indicate that a
partner, Michael Advocate, had deliberately caused the fire. Id. at 22-23, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 332
(emphasis added).
136 Id. at 28-29, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
131 See Ohio Insurance Institute, 2002 Ohio Insurance Facts: Arson: A Costly Crime, at
http://www.ohioinsurance.org/factbook2002/chapter5/chapter5 c.shtml (2002). According to this
study, there are indications that the incidence of arson is increasing. Id.
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Secondly, depending on the willingness of insurers to pass the savings
on to insureds, recoupment through subrogation could have a diminishing
effect on premiums. One particular benefit to the courts could be that if
insurers are more willing to make quick, uncontested payments on claims
of innocent insureds, courts would find their dockets less burdened with
actions by innocent insureds against insurers on these claims, as well as
bad faith causes of action between the same parties.
In cases in which collusion between the spouses is suspected by the
court but not proven, if the assets of the two spouses are collusively shared
between them, there will be no net increase of assets to share, since the
proceeds to the innocent spouse will be offset by the subrogated recovery
against the guilty spouse. In addition to having a deterrent effect on the
commission of arson in the first place, this could help in satisfying the
court that a liberal allowance of recovery by apparently "innocent" spouses
will not result in benefits from insurance proceeds to collusive couples.
The downside, of course, is that this only works to the extent that the guilty
spouse has independent leviable assets to satisfy a subrogated judgment.
The one obvious detriment to allowing liberal subrogation is that if
the "innocent" spouse is truly innocent and the couple remains together
with shared assets, the innocent spouse will lose the net benefit of the
proceeds to rebuild the home to the extent that the guilty spouse can satisfy
the subrogated claim of the insurer. This simply means that in this
circumstance, the principle of disallowing a wrongdoer to profit from his
wrongdoing takes precedence over the principle that an innocent spouse
shall not be made to suffer for the wrongs of his spouse.
It should be noted that all of the considerations discussed above
translate to other situations in which the property of co-insureds is the
object of arson by one of the co-insureds. For example, in situations where
the property of a partnership is deliberately destroyed by one of the
partners acting alone, payment of the insurance claim to the partnership
would surely result in a pro rata sharing of the benefits by the guilty
partner as long as the partnership remains intact. This could certainly
disparage allowance of the insurance claim by the court to the detriment of
the partnership itself and all innocent partners. If, however, the offending
partner were considered a non-insured for the purpose of this claim,
subrogation of the insurer to the partnership's tort claim could strip the
138See Ohio Insurance Institute, 2002 Ohio Insurance Facts: The Impact of Insurance
Fraud, at http://www.ohioinsurance.org/factbook2002/chapter5/chapter5_d.shtml (2002).
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offending partner of a share in the benefit of the proceeds and free the
court to uphold the claim of the partnership.13 9
Since the subrogated cause of action would be for the full amount of
the covered loss, which would exceed the pro rata share of the single
partner in the benefit of the proceeds, the threat of subrogation and the
potential net loss to the partner could act as a more effective deterrent than
in the case of a guilty spouse.
In the case of corporate property deliberately destroyed by a
shareholder, the necessity for subrogation to balance the equities depends
on the percentage of corporate stock owned by the shareholder. If the
arson is committed by a small shareholder in a publicly held corporation,
the personal benefit of the proceeds to the guilty shareholder may be so
insignificant as to be a non-factor in the court's decision to grant the
insurance claim of the corporation. The deterrent and other equitable
benefits of placing the ultimate loss on the wrongdoer instead of the
insurer, however, would still remain.
If, on the other hand, the guilty shareholder owns a significant
percentage of the corporation's stock and would personally reap a major
benefit from the insurance proceeds, subrogation may be a necessary
antidote to free the court to allow the corporation's insurance claim. Cases
in between will fall on one side or the other of this necessity depending on
the discretion of the court.
One complication that might arise when a corporation is the insured
and the arsonist is the sole or major shareholder, is that the court might
pierce the corporate veil and hold that the shareholder and the corporation
are one entity. It would then be difficult to write an opinion that does not
attribute the arson to the corporation, which would then be barred from
recovering the proceeds under the policy. Even if the act of arson were
found to be the sole act of the shareholder acting separately, it would be
difficult to find the shareholder, who is then equated with the corporation,
140
a non-insured under the policy for subrogation purposes.
In sum, a wholesale swing of precedents toward eliminating
impediments to subrogation on the part of insurers, together with a
concomitant end run around theoretical doctrines that prevent recovery of
proceeds by innocent co-insureds, would seem to advance the twin goal of
placing the loss on the wrongdoer and preventing the innocent party from
139

See Advocate, 162 A.D.2d at 27, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 335 (reasoning that the insurance

company should not be prohibited from obtaining retribution from an apparent guilty party
through subrogation).
140 See Cora Pub., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 619 F.2d 482, 486
(5th Cir. 1980) (citing Gen.
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1970)).
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suffering the frequently irreplaceable loss because of the actions of the
guilty co-insured.
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